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Abstract. Denial of Service (DoS) attacks constitute a major security
threat to today’s Internet. This challenge is especially pertinent to the
Internet of Things (IoT) as devices have less computing power, memory
and security mechanisms to mitigate DoS attacks. This paper presents a
model that mimics the unique characteristics of a network of IoT devices,
including components of the system implementing ‘Crypto Puzzles’ - a
DoS mitigation technique. We created an imitation of a DoS attack on
the system, and conducted a quantitative analysis to simulate the impact
such an attack may potentially exert upon the system, assessing the trade
off between security and throughput in the IoT system. We model this
through stochastic model checking in PRISM and provide evidence that
supports this as a valuable method to compare the efficiency of different
implementations of IoT systems, exemplified by a case study.
1 Introduction
A DoS attack targets the availability of a device or network [9], with the in-
tent of disrupting system usability. The most common method is referred to
as Flooding DoS [10], and may be used as an attempt to deplete the devices’
resources including memory, bandwidth and/or battery. A DoS attack against
an IoT network has the potential to be significantly more detrimental than one
against a standard network. This increased vulnerability is due in part to the
low computational power and battery power characteristic of IoT devices [13].
The extant literature has delineated several potential approaches that may
be effective in the mitigation of a DoS attack [14]. This paper focuses on one
such method, known as “Client Crypto Puzzles”[2], one of the most common
mitigation techniques. We evaluate the probability of the system (or subsystem)
being denied within a specific time frame in an IoT network. Using our proposed
model we are able to assess properties such as: i) At what point is the mitigation
technique doing more harm than good? ii) How does denial of a single device
impact functionality of the entire system? iii) Does it create a snowball effect?
Client puzzles take many forms, but the general purpose is to force the
sender to perform a computationally intensive task prior to authentication, con-
sequently reducing their ability to spam messages [2]. Client puzzles have been
adapted in IoT systems [7] and have been shown to successfully decrease effec-
tiveness of a DoS attack. It is however of high computational intensiveness. In
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the specific context of IoT, an additional consideration is that a client puzzle
(especially one of high complexity) can place strain on the battery, causing high
delays in throughput whilst a client is occupied with solving the client puzzles. If
the puzzle drains battery at a rate equivalent (or more) than a flooding attack,
the increased security may actually harm the system. In this paper we model
the tradeoff between security and throughput in addition to the impact the in-
crease in computation has on a device’s battery life span. It is also the particular
case where in the scope of the IoT one device being denied will not harm the
system as one device may be performing an inconsequential or very small task.
We model this through the connectivity of devices. We can observe the potential
snowball effect of a system as the denial of one particular device will increase the
probability that other devices are also going down. Through the model we can
observe the scenario where DoS mitigation, throughput and decrease in battery
are at optimal balance to obtain the best possible result in all three cases. From
this, we may model the ideal setup given specific number of devices, connectiv-
ity of the devices and DoS strain. In particular we demonstrate that in some
cases mitigation techniques can actuallt increase the likelihood of a DoS, due to
drainage of battery.
The aim of this research is to quantify the potential impact of a DoS attack on
a multi protocol network within the IoT and to gauge how a potential mitigation
method affects performance. The key contributions include:
1. A model of two types of IoT device networks, one with DoS mitigation in
place and one without.
2. Verification and simulation of these networks to investigate trade-off between
security and throughput under a DoS attack.
The remainder of this paper is divided into the following sections; section
2- discusses other work concerned with quantifying impact of DoS and the IoT;
section 3 - describes our model; section 4 - details our analysis technique; section
5 - outlines the setup for our experiments; section 6 - highlights findings and
results; and Section 7 concludes the paper, summarising our contribution and
ongoing work.
2 Related Work
Since their advent, systems security properties have been modeled and verified
using a variety of tools including probabilistic model checking. Analysis of DoS
mitigation techniques has been widely covered, Tritilanunt et al. [15] used colored
petri net to verify the effectiveness of HiP client puzzles for DoS mitigation.
They mainly used simulation under different scenarios of possible DoS attacks
and proposed techniques to predict DoS attacks in advance.
Similarly Basagiannis et al. [5] also looked at HIP, making use of verifica-
tion techniques. They used probabilistic model checker PRISM, introducing a
probabilistic attacker model to analyze the effectiveness of HIP and created dif-
ferent attack paths to break the DoS mitigation technique. Their work focuses
on a single complete exchange between an initiator and respondent, creating a
Dolev-Yao-like attacker.
Several papers address modeling IoT, adopting various different approaches.
Authors of [3, 12] have worked on modeling a specific IoT protocol on the trans-
port layer, looking at MQTT and CoAP respectively. Fruth [6] examines various
properties of a Wireless Network protocol including connectivity and energy
power through PRISM, and evaluates it on a Wireless Sensor Network System.
The author evaluates the battery drainage of certain randomized protocols.
Throughput vs security is a common research question in analysis network.
Abdelhakim et al. [1] present work on this particular topic in the context of
wireless sensor networks. Their paper introduces a concept of security routing,
optimized with throughput to present optimum routing.
An abundance of research exists on effectiveness of client puzzles and through-
put vs security. However when we have devices actually going down due to bat-
tery strain we observe a phenomenon of snowball effect, and as a consequence
the manner in which we implement the network needs to change. To the best of
our knowledge we are the first to combine concepts of IoT Systems, restricted
resources of IoT devices and DoS attacks in a probabilistic model checking en-
vironment.
3 Model for IoT Devices
To implement the model we made use of PRISM Model Checker [8] and Con-
tinuous Time Markov Chains (CTMC) to abstract systems of IoT devices. The
PRISM tool also allows use of statistical model checking, a technique which is
particularly effective since modeling multiple devices exacerbate the state space
immensely. We ran a series of experiments using different parameters, including
DoS attacks against different device setups and different parts of the network.
The choice to use CTMC was due to their stochastic properties and the fact
that events occur spontaneously, resulting in a wider range of scenarios. A DoS
attack is unstoppable given enough time and resource sand as such we deemed
time to be a key factor in our analysis. To calculate the likelihood of specific
scenarios taking place we use the PRISM verification tools and Probabilistic
Computational Tree (PCTL). PCTL is a probabilistic extension to Computa-
tional Tree Logic[4] and provides means to evaluate behavior of the system. The
model abstracts an IoT network under DoS strain, and it is implemented as a
system of devices.
A device is a sensor connected to the internet with its own power supply.
A key aspect of the IoT is that different devices might have different battery
lives and different security features (in this paper, we focus on whether a device
is implementing a DoS mitigation technique). Hence, we consider the following
device properties: a battery life, a message queue and connectivity (what other
devices it can connect to). Battery life is a measure that is drained whenever a
computationally intensive operation takes place such as sending a message and
computing a client puzzle. A device can only hold a limited number of messages,
and after the queue reaches capacity it cannot receive more until it has replied
with acknowledgments. If a recipient device queue is full the initiator waits until
it either frees up or timeouts and then resends. To model connectivity each device
has a set of other devices it can communicate with and receive messages from.
To implement the concept of processing time we implemented arbitrary delays
when processing client puzzles.
We introduce the concept of “gentlemen devices” and “rude devices”. A gen-
tleman device will utilize “politeness”, i.e. they will send a message and wait
for an acknowledgment (or timeout if acknowledgment takes too long) from the
recipient and conclude his current discussion with the device before initiating
another message exchange with the same device. It can however simultaneously
hold exchanges with other devices. Rude devices on the other hand may continue
sending messages to devices within their connectivity before the full communi-
cation is over, replicating a flooding attack. The effects of these rude devices
flooding spreads as even gentleman devices connected to the flooded device will
not be able to commence an exchange if its message queue is full.
The attacker or rude device can have different rates of attack, mimicking
different strengths of a DoS attack. We assume it sits outside the network and
is not part of the connectivity so it can target any node, but gentleman devices
cannot perform an exchange with it. To further simulate the attack strength,
at each attack a proportional amount of battery is drained depending on the
attack’s intensity (rate). We use stochastic probabilities to target random parts
of the system as we assume an attacker has no knowledge of the system setup.
Due to the connectivity element an attack on one part of the system may exert
a higher impact than an attack on another part e.g. If devices B and C only
communicate with A, the denial of A stalls the whole system whilst the denial
of B still allows the system to function.
Formally, a rude device R is a tuple R = (S, sinit, A,R, L), where S =
{idle, active} is a set of states, sinit = idle is the initial state, A = {msg, ack}
is a set of actions, R is a matrix containing the rates at which any of the actions
are performed, e.g.,
(
0 1
1 0
)
shows there is a rate of 0 to go from idle to idle, a
rate of 1 to go from idle to active, a rate of 1 to go from active to idle and a
rate of 0 to go from active to active, finally L is an atomic proposition defined
as guard→action where the guard must be true in order for the action to take
place and take the attacker into the next state.
The behavior of a rude device is defined as follows: if the device is in state
idle, there is a probability to move to the state active; if the device is in state
active, the attacker chooses a random node in the network and starts flooding
it. If that particular part of the network has mitigation technique in place at
each message it has to solve the crypto hash before sending again. The attack
continues until the devices battery has been drained. The attacker then goes
back to idle. The guard is used to make sure the attacker behaves within the
scope of the model. The first atomic proposition assures that the attacker does
not target multiple parts of the network simultaneously and then switches to
active and the second guard follows the steps to fill the message queue and drain
the battery.
The other nodes in the network or gentleman devices may either have DoS
mitigation techniques or not. A gentleman device G is formally defined as G =
(S, sinit, A,R, L), where S = {idle, sending, receiving} is a set states, sinit =
idle is the initial state, A = {msg, ack, challenge} is a set of actions, R is a
matrix containing the rates at which any of the actions are performed, e.g.,( 0 1 1
1 0 0
1 0 0
)
shows there is a rate of 0 to go from idle to idle, a rate of 1 to go from
idle to sending as well as a rate of 1 to go to receiving, a rate of 1 to go from
receiving to idle and a rate of 1 to go from sending to idle, and L is an atomic
proposition defined as guard→action, there are guards to enable the correct
behavior of message exchange (e.g. idle, A to B, B to (ACK) A, idle).
The behavior of a gentleman device without mitigation technique is as fol-
lows: when idle, G is active and has a chance to begin a communication between
any of his connected devices. From idle it can transition to any of two other
states sending and receiving. If sending, G sends a message to a connected de-
vice and the battery is drained, it then initiates a timer, if the acknowledgment
is not received before the timer runs out the device goes back to idle however
the reset drains the battery, if it is received it finishes the exchange and also
resets to idle. If receiving, the message is added to the queue and the initiator
is noted as to direct the ACKs to the right initiator (multiple messages may be
received at the same time). The acknowledgment is then sent and the device is
reset to idle and the queue is decreased. To implement a device with mitigation
techniques, we add the following properties to a gentleman device; if in state re-
ceiving before it can send the acknowledgment to a initiator with client puzzles
there is a time delay to portray the time it would take to solve a puzzle. The
time delay increases when the size of K increases, as it mimics how a harder
puzzle is more difficult to resolve. We refer the reader to [2] for some examples
of client puzzles.
4 Verification
To test our model we ran a variety of experiments with different systems and
security setups. One of the key aspects of our experiment was how the impact of
the DoS attacks scaled with different attack rates, different setups and how it ef-
fected the throughput and security to investigate the viability of these mitigation
techniques in the context of the IoT. The ideal scenario is when the probability
of being denied within time T is low and the throughput after T seconds is high.
Observing these circumstances in finite systems where there is a set number of
devices, we looked at all possible setups the system could take in terms of how
many devices are protected and by what level of client puzzles, and then tested
them under different DoS strains. Using the result we can tell which setup is the
best suited to a particular rate of DoS and which setup will maximize through-
put and security. We theorized that given the circumstances of the IoT and the
relatively high processing times at certain levels of puzzle difficulty it would be
the case that the lowering in chance of denial would not be as significant as the
corresponding lowering in throughput caused by the processing delays, this is
analyzed in the case study provided in Section 6.1.
We made use of statistical model checking when examining the larger models
through PRISM’s simulation engine. This approach is particularly useful on
very large models when normal model checking is infeasible. Essentially, this
is achieved by sampling: generating a large number of random paths through
the model, evaluating the result of the given properties on each run, and using
this information to generate an approximately correct result within a specific
Confidence Interval (CI). Let X denote the true result of the query P =?[...] and
Y the approximation generated. The confidence interval is [Y −w, Y +w], i.e. w
gives the half-width of the interval. The confidence level, which is usually stated
as a percentage, is 100(1− Confidence)%. This means that the actual value X
should fall into the confidence interval [Y −w, Y +w]100(1−Confidence)% of
the time [11]. We tested for the following properties.
Throughput: the number of messages processed over a given time interval
(cumulative messages sent/current time). By definition if a message takes longer
to send the throughput will decrease, hence adding computationally intensive
tasks that delay the transmittance of messages is going to decrease the systems
throughput. However if they delay the likelihood of devices being taken down
by an attacker the theory is that in the long run it will actually increase the
throughput under DoS attacks. To calculate the throughput of the IoT system we
make use of PCTL formula R{Msg sent} =?[C <= T ] or what is the cumulative
total messages sent by the system in time T and then divide the answer by the
value T. The value Msg sent is a reward structure that assigns one reward every
time a successful message exchange is completed.
Likelihood of System being denied: we defined the denial of a device,
when either its battery has been completely drained or its connected devices have
been drained and it therefore cannot transfer from the idle state. The whole sys-
tem is down when all devices have been denied. This is once again monitored
through PCTL over a restricted time, running different variables one can opti-
mize the number of protected devices as well a what strength of protection to
optimize the implementation least likely to be denied.
Snowball effect due to denial: of further interest is the ability to recog-
nize the critical sectors of a system. We defined a critical sector by examining
the impact it’s denial has on the rest of the system. Highly critical sectors are
also the parts of the system which require more securing. We achieve this by
measuring the snowball effect or rather after the denial of device A what is the
new probability of the rest of the system being down. Theoretically highly criti-
cal devices will increase the probability substantially whilst non critical devices
will make a small difference.
To observe the best case scenario of a particular setup, we define a setup as a
particular spread and strength of mitigation techniques on a given configuration
of devices. We observe the balance between security and throughput, the higher
the ratio the better the setup for that particular DoS strength. To observe and
test the initial hypothesis in Section 6.1 we create a case study on a specific
scenario and evaluate the results for each possible implementation given specific
assumptions.
5 Experiment Setup
We have used the model described above in PRISM Model Checker as well as
PCTL to perform both quantitative verification and simulations, various prop-
erties where checked and the model was tested under different scenarios. For
verification the full state space is explored whilst for simulation we use the fol-
lowing setup. Number of Samples: 100,000, CI: 0.001 and Maximum Path
Length: 1,000,000. For the purpose of the model we were interested in evaluat-
ing two key properties: throughput and probability of denial.
We can also examine which part of the subnetwork has been denied first
and specifically the time required for the denial to take place. The setup for
each experiment was: Client Puzzle Difficulties (K size): 5 to 20s, Time
of system (Seconds): 20 to 200s, Devices in Network (All protected):
9 and Rude Devices: 1. This differentiated from the case study where all the
variables were tested in all possible setups (with some specifications explained
in section 6.1) to find the optimal setup.
Results from the initial setup highlight the key factors of our model i) the
way client puzzles drain battery ii) the effectiveness of mitigation techniques to
avoid denial of service and iii) demonstrating that in finite time it can sometimes
be useful to have a less intensive client puzzle as they can disrupt more than
help.
6 Results
We demonstrated the potential strain that client puzzles place on a system and
as can be seen in Fig. 1 at lower times (i.e. before any part of the systems are
under DoS or haven’t gone down yet), the higher client puzzles create such a
strain that they increase the likelihood of going down rather than diminish it.
It can be observed that the harder the puzzle, the lower the throughput,
whilst the security is increased. Furthermore, due to the extra drainage in power
of the more difficult puzzle, a smaller value of K performs better in earlier times
(At time 80s we observe that K=20 has a higher denial probability than K=15
this is due to the extra processing strain and battery drainage of the harder
puzzle). As can be observed towards time 200s the throughputs come to a stall
as different parts of the system are denied. It is to be noted that as the lower
puzzle difficulties are declining in throughput, K=20 is on the rise, as the increase
in security allows for some nodes to still output messages.
6.1 Case Study
We apply our model to a specific scenario to demonstrate its application. We
assume a potential system engineer views their IoT network as under constant
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Fig. 1. The graphs represents a system being targeted by a DoS attack, the one on the
left displays the probability of a DoS attack being successful over time (20s to 200s).
The graph on the right represents the throughput of the system over time (20s to 200s).
DoS attack. They wishes to know what would be the best way to optimize the
balance between throughput of their system and the likelihood of being denied
when implementing security mitigation for these DoS attacks. Furthermore, their
IoT system is collecting very critical data in a short time frame so it is important
for the system to work at its best for the initial 100s. The setup is the following;
A is connected to B, B is connected to A, C is connected to A, B and C, and
D is connected to C. We also assume a rude device E, which is connected to all
devices.
We ran every single scenario of setups (A protected, AB protected, B pro-
tected...) and for each scenario tried every single possible value of K. We set
the value of Battery to be 50, a maximum message queue of 5, Time at 100s, a
single rude Device (E) with rate of attack the same as the rate of any gentle-
man device (ABCD) and the values of K from 5 to 15 tested on every protected
device, the results can be observed in Table 1. If we use our formula of through-
put/probability of denial, with the highest value being the most optimal result.
We see that the scenario AD provided the best ratio at every different value of K,
with scenarios including C being connected (the one with the most connectivity)
not performing as well.
The results support our initial hypothesis that mitigation techniques actu-
ally increase the likelihood of denial through battery drainage alone. This is
evidenced by the scenarios which had C protected that proved to be the most
inefficient (throughput dropped significantly). The rude devices have an equal
chance of attacking as the gentleman devices. As a consequence, since every sin-
gle connection to a protected device will drain the battery and since there is
equal chance a rude device will start an attack, the strain on the battery caused
by normal message sending (and computing of puzzles) is more detrimental.
However if we take ACD which theoretically protects the network on all levels
and D which is not very connected and test both these two under a longer period
of time (200s) we can see the results are altered, as the attackers will continue
Table 1. Every Scenarios For each setup of Protected Devices (PD) and Unprotected
Devices (UD), each setup has a single rude device E targeting the other gentlemen
devices
K = 5 K = 10 K = 15
PD UD Probability Throughput Probability Throughput Probability Throughput
A BCD 0.655 0.733353 0.712 0.713375 0.729 0.726894
AB CD 0.624 0.654857 0.645 0.636341 0.829 0.646891
ABC D 0.887 0.684555 0.963 0.580316 0.996 0.513519
ACD B 0.956 0.547798 0.986 0.346246 0.997 0.241135
ADB C 0.946 0.423408 0.951 0.309469 0.972 0.267136
AC BD 0.964 0.772681 0.979 0.662404 0.988 0.582111
AD CB 0.461 0.739893 0.415 0.690475 0.381 0.687251
B ACD 0.496 0.741337 0.487 0.723239 0.465 0.717923
BC AD 0.817 0.713618 0.899 0.617848 0.959 0.547188
BCD A 0.938 0.520275 0.968 0.3279814 0.985 0.228197
BD AC 0.927 0.454418 0.927 0.362362 0.954 0.313664
C ABD 0.901 0.843735 0.91 0.72117 0.959 0.663217
CD AB 0.897 0.555124 0.919 0.38078 0.939 0.279741
D ABC 0.859 0.610293 0.878 0.536433 0.862 0.535952
until a device is denied. On the other hand, if it takes longer to take down a
device, the overall system lasts longer and therefore the throughput is higher
with the protected devices. We also show that identifying single critical devices
and protecting them rather than the whole system can be a valuable technique.
These results exemplify the potential application and benefit of these techniques.
As can be expected one simple solution to increase both the throughput and
the security is to increase device battery or upgrade processing power. An al-
ternative solution may be to replace the critical devices with more potent ones.
However assuming the device specifications are constant and the only customiza-
tion is the strength of the puzzles and which devices to protect, through our tool
we are able to identify what produces the best results. The topic of battery adds
a further layer to the common question of security vs output and creates several
additional layers of complexity. What we have gathered from our analysis and
results is in line with our initial hypothesis. Furthermore, this model enables the
discovery of critical sections in an IoT system which might not be as easy to
find compared to our simplified case study.
7 Conclusion
We have presented a model that provides means to quantify the effectiveness of a
DoS threat on a potential IoT system. Our methodology enables for a potential
user to make informed decisions regarding the potential implementation of their
system. By using a combination of verification and simulation we confirmed the
hypothesis that for the usage in IoT some mitigation techniques could potentially
cause harm, however thanks to this tool, one can now make sure to maximize
their systems effectiveness. Our future work will look into applying this model
to a real world implementation to evaluate the effectiveness of the analysis. We
also intend to evaluate different mitigation techniques and specific IoT protocols.
Further experimentation could also assess different kinds of IoT devices. We have
used the term IoT node to represent a low powered device. However further tests
could also examine the best kind of device for balancing their processing power
against effectiveness.
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